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SUMMARY
This paper addresses ethical, legal, and psychosocial aspects of Global Kid-
ney Exchange (GKE). Concerns have been raised that GKE violates the
nonpayment principle, exploits donors in low- and middle-income coun-
tries, and detracts from the aim of self-sufficiency. We review the argu-
ments for and against GKE. We argue that while some concerns about
GKE are justified based on the available evidence, others are speculative
and do not apply exclusively to GKE but to living donation more gener-
ally. We posit that concerns can be mitigated by implementing safeguards,
by developing minimum quality criteria and by establishing an interna-
tional committee that independently monitors and evaluates GKE’s proce-
dures and outcomes. Several questions remain however that warrant
further clarification. What are the experiences and views of recipients and
donors participating in GKE? Who manages the escrow funds that have
been put in place for donor and recipients? What procedures and safe-
guards have been put in place to prevent corruption of these funds? What
are the inclusion criteria for participating GKE centers? GKE provides
opportunity to promote access to donation and transplantation but can
only be conducted with the appropriate safeguards. Patients’ and donors’
voices are missing in this debate.
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Glossary
Alliance for Paired Kidney Donation (APD)
a charitable foundation that aims to establish a
universal system that pairs living persons willing to
donate a kidney with those needing kidney transplants,
in order to increase the number of living donor kidney
transplants; improve outcomes for kidney transplant
recipients; and significantly reduce public and private
costs incurred by chronic kidney disease
Council of Europe (CoE)
an international organization whose aim is to uphold
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in Europe
Council of Europe Committee on Organ
Transplantation (CD-P-TO)
the steering committee in charge of organ
transplantation activities at the European Directorate
for the Quality of Medicines & Healthcare
Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in
Human Organs (CoE Convention)
a treaty that calls on governments to establish the illegal
removal of human organs from living or deceased
donors as a criminal offense. Legally binding for
governments that ratify the convention. Ratified by 9
member states at time of writing
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Transplant International
Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and
Transplant Tourism 2018 Edition (DoI)
statement that defines and prohibits organ trafficking,
trafficking in persons for organ removal, and transplant
tourism. Calls upon transplant professionals to endorse
ethical transplant practices. Not legally binding
Declaration of Istanbul Custodian Group (DICG)
a group of professionals that promotes, implements,
and upholds the Declaration of Istanbul so as to
combat organ trafficking, transplant tourism, and
transplant commercialism and encourages adoption of
effective and ethical transplantation practices around
the world
European Network for Collaboration on Kidney
Exchange Programmes (ENCKEP)
a network supported by European Cooperation in
Science and Technology. Brings together policy makers,
clinicians, economists, social scientists, and optimization
experts in Europe in order to establish and foster a
channel for a transnational European kidney exchange
program
European Society for Organ Transplantation (ESOT)
the umbrella organization under which transplant
activities are structured and streamlined in Europe and
worldwide
Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial Aspects of
Transplantation (ELPAT)
European platform that brings continuity and progress
in European research and dialogue on Ethical, Legal,
and Psychosocial Aspects of organ Transplantation.
Section of ESOT
European Union’s National Competent Authorities on
Organ Donation and Transplantation (NCA)
bodies within the governments of the European Union
member states that transpose European Union
requirements related to organ donation and
transplantation into national law
Global Kidney Exchange (GKE)
an international kidney exchange program that
facilitates cross-border exchanges between
immunologically incompatible donor–recipient pairs in
high-income countries
Kidney exchange programs (KEP)
programs that enable transplantation for recipients who
have a willing living donor but are blood and/or HLA
incompatible with this donor. These incompatible pairs
join a pool of recipient–donor pairs and compatible
matches are made using an algorithm, also referred to
as kidney sharing schemes
World Health Organization (WHO)
an international organization that directs international
health within the United Nations’ system and leads
partners in global health responses. Its Guiding
Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ
Transplantation outline principles that are intended to
provide an orderly, ethical and acceptable framework
for the procurement and transplantation of human
cells, tissues, and organs for therapeutic
purposes
Introduction
In 2017, Rees et al. [1] introduced “Global Kidney
Exchange” (GKE), an international kidney exchange
program that facilitates cross-border exchanges between
immunologically incompatible donor–recipient pairs in
high-income countries (HIC) and biologically compati-
ble but financially impoverished donor–recipient pairs
in low- to middle-income countries (LMIC). GKE aims
to overcome immunologic barriers in the developed
world and poverty barriers in the developing world. The
underlying rationale is that financial barriers prevent
transplantation much more frequently than organ scar-
city. The number of patients dying annually worldwide
from end-stage kidney disease due to inadequate finan-
cial resources far exceeds the number of patients in
developed countries placed on kidney transplantation
waitlists [1-3]. GKE has the potential to expand the
genetic diversity of the donor pool which may help to
transplant difficult-to-transplant, highly immunized
patients [1].
In GKE, the health insurance company of the HIC
recipient funds both transplants from the costs saved
from avoiding or ceasing dialysis. This way, barriers are
removed for patients who have a willing living donor
but cannot afford the operation or do not have health
insurance to cover the costs of donation and transplan-
tation. For national health systems in HIC, global
exchange is more cost-effective than continued dialysis.
For example, a recent analysis of renal replacement
therapy costs in The Netherlands indicates that after a
successful transplantation, costs are annually approxi-
mately 14–19% of annual dialysis costs [4]. In addition,
a new donor–recipient pair in the pool facilitates the
transplantation for HIC incompatible pairs and
increases the potential to make new chains. At the time
of writing, Rees et al. have performed 7 GKE exchanges
2 Transplant International 2020;
ª 2020 The Authors. Transplant International published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Steunstichting ESOT
Ambagtsheer et al.
with The Philippines, Denmark, and Mexico, enabling
36 transplantations [5].
Global Kidney Exchange has received criticism and
opposition from the Council of Europe Committee on
Organ Transplantation (CD-P-TO), the European
Union’s National Competent Authorities on Organ
Donation and Transplantation (NCA), the Declaration
of Istanbul Custodian Group (DICG), and a number of
transplant professionals [6-11]. Their concerns are that
GKE:
1. violates the principle of nonpayment for organs and
constitutes organ trafficking;
2. is exploitative;
3. is coercive;
4. may be undermined by corruption;
5. cannot guarantee proper care for living donors and
transplant recipients in LMIC;
6. detracts from countries becoming self-sufficient.
In this paper, we discuss the concerns raised against
GKE, but also discuss the potential merits of GKE by
providing an overview of ethical, legal, and psychosocial
considerations. In doing so, we aim to offer a balanced,
evidence-based view of arguments for and against GKE.
Does GKE violate the principle of nonpayment
for organs and does it constitute “organ
trafficking”?
Global Kidney Exchange provides funding for a kidney
transplant procedure (surgery and related medical treat-
ment) to recipients from a LMIC in exchange for a liv-
ing donor who facilitates a chain of transplants in HIC
[1]. According to the DICG, the CD-P-TO, and others,
this funding violates the nonpayment principle and con-
stitutes “organ trafficking” [6-9,12]. The principle of
nonpayment stipulates that “the human body and its
parts shall not give rise to financial gain or comparable
advantage” [13,14]. The definition of organ trafficking
has been laid down in the 2015 Council of Europe Con-
vention against Trafficking in Human Organs [15] (CoE
Convention) and in the 2018 edition of the Declaration
of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tour-
ism (DoI) [16]. According to these instruments, virtu-
ally all commercial dealings in organs constitute “organ
trafficking” [17,18]. Consequently, whereas organ traf-
ficking was initially only associated with exploiting per-
sons for their organs [19,20], it is now also considered
to include the removal of organs for financial gain or
comparable advantage [7,9,21].
Rees et al. claim that GKE does not violate the non-
payment principle, but that it is consistent with the
altruistic exchanges in kidney exchange programs (KEP)
that are accepted practice in many countries. According
to them, donors participating in GKE do not “sell” their
organ, but “trade” one healthy kidney for another, simi-
lar to donors in KEP [1]. The authors further empha-
size that GKE removes disincentives for those who
would gladly donate a kidney to a friend or family
member but cannot due to financial barriers [1].
Removing financial barriers to organ donation is an
internationally agreed objective, enshrined, among
others, in the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ
Transplantation and in the CoE Convention [13,15].
These organizations highlight that prohibition of organ
payments does not preclude reimbursing expenses
incurred by the donor, including the costs of medical
procedures [13,17]. Given that countries’ legislation
vary in their approach to what constitutes illicit pay-
ment versus legitimate reimbursement, it is doubtful
whether GKE violates the nonpayment principle under
all circumstances. For example, the University of Min-
nesota’s legal team vetted GKE and agreed to proceed.
Other hospital legal teams have followed suit [1]. How-
ever, given the CoE Convention’s rather broad defini-
tion of “organ trafficking” and the vagueness of the
term, “comparable advantage”, it is possible that GKE
might be considered unlawful in countries that have rat-
ified the CoE Convention [22].1
Whether GKE is considered illegal is however, in our
view, not the most critical issue. The prohibition of
payment for organs and organ trafficking has received
considerable critique, among others for conflating pay-
ments with “trafficking”, for failing to eradicate the
crime, driving the trade underground and for exposing
victims to further harm [20,23-28]. Furthermore, laws
are known to follow changing transplant practices [29].
A more relevant question is therefore, whether GKE will
help to induce or prevent organ trafficking. While orga-
nizations such as the DICG and CD-P-TO fear that
allowing GKE will induce the crime, empirical research
suggests that what drives organ trafficking more than
scarcity is the global inequity in access to donation and
transplantation and the growing divide between the rich
and poor [28,30-32]. On the one hand, GKE has the
potential to reduce global disparities in access to
1 As of the beginning of 2020, the CoE Convention has been ratified by
Albania, Croatia, Czech Republic, Latvia, Malta, Montenegro, Norway,
Portugal and Moldova. For further details, see https://www.coe.int/en/
web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/216/signatures?p_auth=
p6Mz9GHQ
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donation and transplantation, in particular, to prevent
that only the rich patients have access to transplantation
[1,33]. On the other hand, this aim can only be
achieved if GKE is carried out on a larger scale. Cur-
rently, GKE only offers access to transplantation to a
select few [1]. If GKE succeeds in reducing disparities in
access to donation and transplantation, GKE may con-
tribute to preventing organ trafficking rather than being
a constituent of it. If this turns out to be the case, GKE
will fulfill the same objectives that the Council of Eur-
ope, the DICG and other international bodies have (un-
til now unsuccessfully) been trying to achieve.
Is GKE exploitative?
One criticism of GKE is that it is exploitative, and in
order to assess the strength of this claim one must be
clear about what one means by exploitation. There is
disagreement over where the wrongness of exploitation
lies, and it may differ from case to case. It has variously
been suggested that exploitation is wrong because it
takes advantage of and fails to protect the vulnerable,
because it uses people solely as a means to an end, and
because it fails to benefit a disadvantaged person in the
way that fairness requires [34]. The DICG alludes to
some of these aspects when it states that “[e]xploitation
occurs when someone takes advantage of a vulnerability
in another person for their own benefit, creating a dis-
parity in the benefits gained by the two parties” [9]. It
is hard to see, however, that this description of exploita-
tion can be readily applied to GKE. Primarily, it is not
clear that there is a significant disparity in benefits
between recipients. Each patient receives a kidney trans-
plant, and as Minerva et al point out, benefits are argu-
ably greater for LMIC recipients, who get the additional
benefit of their follow-up care being paid for [33]. The
same is true for the donors, who each obtain the
desired benefit of their intended beneficiary receiving a
transplant. Rather than there being a morally troubling
disparity in benefit, GKE appears to offer either roughly
equal benefit, or greater benefit for those who are alleg-
edly exploited.
It is also unconvincing to consider GKE exploitative
on other grounds. Rather than failing to protect the
vulnerable, it seems that GKE addresses specific vulnera-
bilities by offering protection to those who are (i) vul-
nerable to death from kidney failure or (ii) vulnerable
to losing a loved one due to kidney failure. It is simi-
larly unconvincing to suggest that GKE treats people
merely as a means to an end. Instead, one can see that
participants in LMIC are respected as individuals, with
measures put in place to protect their welfare and to
ensure that their participation is voluntary.
Another concern raised by Wiseman & Gill, the
DICG, and the CD-P-TO is that GKE is not based on
humanitarian criteria but instead on the usefulness of
the donor from a LMIC for a recipient in a HIC [9,11].
GKE could therefore be considered to be “people in
HIC” taking “advantage of a vulnerability in another
person for their own benefit”. While this means that the
motives of those in HIC may not be purely altruistic,
and that the ultimate reason for GKE’s existence may
be to provide those in HIC with transplants, it does not
make GKE necessarily exploitative. Instead, it empha-
sizes the importance of careful implementation of GKE:
If implemented poorly and with inappropriate safe-
guards to prevent an unfair disparity in benefits, GKE
could become exploitative. If implemented with more
caution, however, with stringent safeguards and moni-
toring to ensure that the rights and welfare of involved
parties are protected, GKE can provide a fair distribu-
tion of benefits and burdens thereby avoiding a charge
of exploitation.
Is GKE coercive?
The claim that donors and recipients in LMIC are too
poor or vulnerable to voluntarily engage in GKE is also
debatable and could be seen as paternalistic. First of all,
the risk that voluntariness is undermined does not apply
specifically to GKE or to LMIC alone, but applies to liv-
ing donation more generally [35]. The argument that a
LMIC donor may feel compelled to donate is equally as
relevant to the HIC donor candidate: Both are willing
but for different reasons cannot help their intended
recipient. The potential for pressure to donate is thus
present in all KEP. A recent study among professionals
demonstrated that safeguarding against coercion is a pri-
mary concern during screening in HIC [36]. Further-
more, while costs incurred and loss of wages during the
living donation process may deter lower-income donor
candidates [37], (low) economic status is not, and
should not, be a contraindication for living donation.
Whether or not participants in GKE feel coerced or
that they made a voluntary decision requires investiga-
tion. This speaks to the need for a qualitative evaluation
of views and experiences of those who participate in
GKE. Risks arising from potential pressure or coercion
can be mitigated by standardized education, psychoso-
cial assessment by mental health professionals, and
informed consent procedures that are already in place
in countries that have formalized living donation
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procedures according to universally recognized stan-
dards [38-43].
Will corruption undermine GKE?
Rees et al. present a carefully regulated living donation
and transplantation program involving a couple from
The Philippines, supported by the Alliance for Paired
Donation (APD). They reportedly plan to continue the
program with transplant centers in Kenya, India, and
Ethiopia [6]. APD has created a $50,000 escrow account
to ensure funding for follow-up care for the Filipino
donor and recipient. Although Rees et al. state that they
aim to rule out malpractices, they do not describe how
they aim to prevent and alleviate possible corruption of
GKE [7,8].
Paradoxically, countries that are most likely to benefit
from GKE are those who are the least likely to have
safeguards in place to prevent corruption. Research into
global financial flows has revealed that more funds leave
certain countries than enters them [44,45]. If lump
sums resulting from GKE are deposited for donors’ and
recipients’ medical fees upon their return to their coun-
try, the questions arise: Who has oversight and access to
these funds? How are they audited? How is long-term
protection of these funds guaranteed? What are the cri-
teria for using the funds (what can the money be used
for and what not)?
Another concern is the inability of some countries to
protect transplant recipients and donors from transplant
abuses [6,9]. GKE seeks to protect and uphold the rights
of individual donors and recipients; however, this is not
a certainty in countries where a black market of organ
trade exists. An increasing number of studies reveal that
some governments have been unable to prevent criminal
networks from infiltrating into their transplant centers,
turn a blind eye to the practice or wittingly facilitate ille-
gal transplants [28,46-51]. In these countries, exploita-
tion of recipients and donors is most often reported
[28,52,53]. In The Philippines, Egypt, Bangladesh, and
India, for instance, researchers have repeatedly demon-
strated that despite these countries’ laws banning organ
trafficking, vulnerable individuals continue to sell kid-
neys, do not receive appropriate pre- and postoperative
aftercare and are not recognized or treated as victims
[52,54-56]. Only a few successful prosecutions of bro-
kers, recruiters, doctors, and other facilitators of illegal
transplants have been reported from both LMIC and
HIC [57-59]. The concern therefore arises whether and
how governments would address corruption or other
violations of GKE if these were to arise.
Rees et al. do not explain how they plan to address
possible issues of corruption of GKE and exploitation of
donors and/or recipients participating in GKE. They
may wish to develop criteria that (prospective) collabo-
rating transplant centers need to satisfy. For example,
they may wish to include only those centers that have a
transparent and long-term track record of successful,
legitimate transplantation and donation procedures,
including standardized donor screening and follow-up
care. All countries participating in GKE, including HIC,
should carry equal responsibility to do what is necessary
to ensure that patients and donors involved in GKE are
adequately protected from the risks associated with cor-
ruption, given the need for GKE to avoid venturing into
the realms of exploitation.
Can GKE guarantee proper care for living
donors and transplant recipients in
participating countries?
Another argument against GKE is that participating
LMIC are incapable of providing long-term care for
transplant recipients and donors [6,9]. This is however
not an argument against GKE, but a critique of coun-
tries that lack appropriate conditions and safeguards for
living donation, registries, and follow-up. It can be
argued that countries that are unable to implement
basic safeguards for living donation should not be con-
ducting living organ transplants in the first place. It has
also been argued that transplant medicine should not
come at the expense of primary health care [60]. For
this reason, some countries have prohibited transplanta-
tion altogether [59].
The claim that these issues only apply to LMIC also
warrant careful consideration. First of all, problems with
follow-up care of donors and transplant recipients are
not exclusively reported from LMIC. Also, HIC struggle
to ensure that donors do not get lost to follow-up [61-
64]. While the international transplant community
agrees upon the necessity of registration of long-term
outcomes [64-67], rates of completion are typically low
[62,63]. Moreover, even in HIC, low-income recipients
experience higher rates of rejection and graft failure
than high-income recipients [68-70]. What’s more, it is
accepted practice in many countries to accept living
kidney donors (usually relatives) who travel from
abroad [71]. After their donation, these donors typically
return to their country of origin, often without guaran-
tee of postoperative and long-term follow-up care. The
focus within GKE therefore on low-income patients in
LMIC may seem inappropriate when there are also low-
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income patients (and donors) in HIC who are in need
of improved care. All recipients and donors should be
guaranteed proper aftercare, whether or not they partic-
ipate in GKE.
Ultimately, the concern that GKE lacks the (financial)
capacity to guarantee long-term care for donors and
recipients may be somewhat overstated. We believe that
such issues can be mitigated by APD and/or by an inde-
pendent committee that monitors and evaluates GKE
and that ensures that the escrow funds are not depleted
or abused.
Does GKE detract from countries becoming
“self-sufficient”?
According to the DICG and NCA, GKE may undermine
local efforts to develop transplant programs in both
LMIC and HIC. More specifically, they claim that GKE
“distracts from efforts to develop sustainable transplant
programs within LMICs such as promoting ethical liv-
ing donation, developing deceased donation, or address-
ing the financial barriers to immunosuppression” [8,9].
According to these bodies, the fairest and most effective
way to address the transplant needs of patients in
LMICs is to develop transplant services in their own
countries [72].
The proclamation that countries have to be self-suffi-
cient was first declared by the 2008 DoI and the WHO
[73,74] and has rapidly gained momentum since [75-
77]. The argument to ban GKE because of the need to
achieve self-sufficiency raises various implications how-
ever. First of all, it implies that the need for countries
to become self-sufficient is more important than the
lives that can be immediately saved through GKE. Is
achievement of self-sufficiency so important that it
overrides life-saving alternatives? Who has the authority
to decide which approach should get priority? Why is it
required that countries become self-sufficient in organ
donation and transplantation, while it is universally
accepted for countries to rely on global exchanges of all
other types of goods and services? Is it realistic to
expect that countries will ever achieve self-sufficiency?
Given these considerations, it is striking that the pro-
claimed importance of achieving self-sufficiency receives
no criticism and scrutiny from within the transplant
community.
Nonetheless, the concern that GKE impedes self-suffi-
ciency is highly speculative. It implies that without
GKE, countries are more likely to become self-sufficient.
Yet, there is no evidence that supports this assumption.
One could also argue that achieving successful kidney
transplantation through GKE could serve as a positive
model to boost the status and reputation of transplanta-
tion and to promote trust in transplant services across
all countries. This may contribute toward achieving self-
sufficiency.
Some transplant professionals have pointed out that
rather than conducting GKE, countries should focus
their efforts on optimizing KEP nationally or region-
ally.2 Only several countries have established national
KEP, namely the USA, South Korea, the UK, Australia,
The Netherlands, Czech Republic, Austria, and Canada
[78]. A number of countries including Greece, Sweden,
Switzerland, Poland, and India have been preparing and
exploring KEP but have not (yet) implemented a full-
running program [79,80]. Most KEP are however not
conducted optimally and report a range of problems.
Examples include lack of knowledge, small pool sizes,
ethical concerns, lack of adequate software, legal barri-
ers, and lack of central coordination [38,79,81]. Some
countries such as Romania and Turkey only run single-
center KEP. The USA has 3 separate KEP; however,
many of its transplant centers are not involved in any
of these programs [79]. Rather, numerous regional and
single-center programs exist among approximately 250
living donor transplant centers [79]. One of the impli-
cations of this fragmented system is that the KEP pro-
grams do not wait to build up their pools, as is
common practice in other countries with national KEP
[79]. Consequently, the success rate of the USA’s KEP is
only 10% [79]. The Netherlands, Australia, and the UK
by contrast report higher success rates due to leveraged
national registries, an oversight body, and frequently
run matching cycles [78].
To optimize KEP, the European Network for Collab-
oration on Kidney Exchange Programmes (ENCKEP)
has recommended that countries merge their national
pools through regional cooperation [81]. Several coun-
tries have started merging their pools with neighboring
countries to perform KEP, including Spain, Italy, and
Portugal, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden [79,82]. In its
forthcoming handbook, ENCKEP presents the criteria
that regional KEP should adhere to:
1. countries should experience similar economical and
societal development,
2. countries should have comparable ethical and cul-
tural values;
2 These statements have been made, for example at the 10th ELPAT
Working Group Meeting in Nice, France, in 2018, at the 5th ELPAT
Conference in Krakow, Poland, in April 2019, and at the EDTCO con-
ference in November 2018 in Munich, Germany.
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3. a robust and sustainable framework with legal cer-
tainty for donors, patients, and professionals should be
in place;
4. there should be comparable conditions and access to
health care for patients [83].
Thus, ENCKEP favors regional KEP over GKE. On
the one hand, it can be argued that optimizing KEP
within countries and with neighboring countries is a
more sustainable solution than engaging in expensive
and potentially controversial intercontinental exchanges
such as GKE. The high genetic diversity in the USA and
Europe, for example, already offers great potential for
optimizing national/regional KEP. This in turn is likely
to diminish the need for GKE. On the other hand, it
can be argued that national/regional KEP, GKE, and
other alternatives can co-exist. Multiple strategies that
complement one another may result in better all-round
results.
GKE: opportunity or exploitation?
In sum, while some concerns about GKE are justified
based on the available evidence, others are speculative
or do not apply exclusively to GKE but to living dona-
tion more generally. We posit that many concerns about
GKE can be mitigated by implementing safeguards, by
developing minimum quality criteria for participating
transplant centers and by establishing an international
committee that independently oversees GKE’s activities.
This committee could be established under the umbrella
of an international organization such as the WHO. Its
tasks could include the following: screening participat-
ing GKE transplant centers, collaborating in defining
inclusion criteria for donor–recipients pairs, monitoring
adherence to procedures, supervising matching algo-
rithms, overseeing escrow accounts, and evaluating the
necessity and suitability of GKE. It could have the
authority to visit and inspect transplant centers partici-
pating in GKE and provide support and remedies in
case of complaints by donors, recipients, and others
participating in GKE. Monitoring and evaluating GKE
can provide the data necessary to assert – in an evi-
dence-based manner – whether GKE is a safe and suc-
cessful strategy for improving access to donation and
transplantation in both HIC and LMIC. Meanwhile,
Rees et al. might wish to consider providing clarifica-
tions to some remaining questions:
1. What are the perspectives, opinions, and experiences
of recipients and donors who have participated in GKE?
2. Who manages the escrow fund(s) that has/have been
put in place for donor and recipient pairs? What
safeguards have been put in place to prevent corruption
of these funds?
3. What are the inclusion criteria for participating GKE
centers? Who initiates the GKE exchanges?
4. What are the inclusion criteria of donor–recipient
pairs in both LMIC and HIC?
5. What is the income level of participating donor–re-
cipient pairs?
6. How, where, and by whom is pretransplant assess-
ment and evaluation of donors and recipients con-
ducted? If the donor and recipient travel to a HIC and
are found not to be able to proceed, for instance
because of a new infection, who pays for the costs
incurred by both the healthcare system and the pair
thus far? If the reason the transplant cannot proceed is
temporary, do the pair remain in the HIC until the
transplant can be carried out?
7. How, where, and by whom is post-transplant care
and long-term follow-up carried out? For how long is
long-term donor and recipient follow-up care guaran-
teed?
8. What impact does GKE have on transplant activity
in participating countries?
Regular updates of GKE case are warranted, including
data on follow-up. GKE may provide a much-needed
opportunity to promote access to donation and trans-
plantation but must coincide with close monitoring,
evaluation, and appropriate safeguards. Patients’ and
donors’ voices are noticeably missing in this debate.
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